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Numerous studies have shown that some non-traditional  (or
low-input, or alternative, or sustainable--I use the terms
interchangeably here) agricultural systems exhibit unit
production costs that are reasonably close to or even lower than
those of more conventional  systems.  In addition, the non-
conventional  systems are reputed to generate fewer off-farm
externalities and to provide a better quality of  life  for
participating producers.  Yet few producers have switched to such
seemingly attractive systems.  Why?
Most new technologies are characterized by initially slow
adoption rates because of  friction in information exchange,
individual  inertia, and other factors.  A  great many economic
factors play a  role.  For example, a critical mass of
participants might be needed for an efficient marketing network
to develop.  Or the new technology may require a  large
investment in physical or in human capital, an  investment that
may take time to accumulate. Is that what's going on with
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Paul.sustainable agriculture?  Should its adherents simply be more
patient?
In this case, patience may not be enough.  The principal
cause of the observed reluctance of farmers to adopt sustainable
techniques, even techniques that have been demonstrated to be
cost competitive on a per planted acre basis,  is the set of
institutions  (or policies or laws or property rules)  that have
grown up around conventional systems.  These institutions so
structure long term costs and incomes that it is  simply not in
the typical farmer's  interests to shift techniques--as  long as
those institutions remain in  force.
Institutions affect economic decisions by structuring
relative prices.  Only as institutions adjust to reflect changes
in relative prices afforded by new technologies  ("induced
institutional innovations"  in Ruttan's terminology),  will a new
pattern of relative prices  force a change in a farmer's  decision
calculus.
This is not a new argument:  institutions have long been
recognized as influencing the pace of technology adoption.
Indeed, some argue that this  is one of the  important benefits of
institutions or property rules;  they prevent too-rapid a shift  in
associated rights and obligations, thereby maintaining a modicum
of social stability.  But few institutions are  immutable.  Most
eventually adjust to new social and technological environments.
2If sustainable agriculture is to significantly alter the way
Americans grow food, its advocates must address three major
institutions that delay wide-scale adoption of these techniques:
(1)  The fact that the government insures crop risk but not
income risk.
(2)  The fact that U.S. law affords farmers the right to
pollute.
(3)  The fact that the government subsidizes crop production
and not farming per se.
I take each up singly, although their roots  are intertwined.
My use of the term "sustainable agriculture" is  intended to
subsume both those systems that focus upon crop selection and
diversification and those that focus upon techniques that attempt
to minimize particular factor inputs or undesired externalities
from production.  The latter systems are often described as  "low
input," although they are more precisely labeled "low chemical"
or  "low pollution" systems.
1. Risk exposure
Because the United States does not guarantee a minimum
income, farmers, like everyone else,  face the chance of going
broke if they make the wrong decisions.  Simply put,  fear of
going broke makes  farmers less willing to gamble.  And adoption
of a new technique like sustainable agriculture is clearly a
gamble--especially since a fully functioning rotation may take
five years or more to establish.  The numerous incentives for
3American managers to give short shift to the long-run view is
well documented.  These are amplified by the possibility of
greatly reduced income during the transition period to a fully
sustainable system.
What the government does subsidize is protection against
individual crop risk.  The existence of federal crop  insurance
provides an additional incentive for farmers  to specialize in
that relative handful of crops for which insurance  is available.
(About twenty crops  are covered in Minnesota.)  There  is also
less reason for farmers to diversify their crop systems--either
through rotations or through diverse plantings--in order to guard
against the risk of individual  crop failure.  Diversification  is
also less necessary to the extent that forward contracting,
hedging, and other private institutional devices help manage
price risk.
2.  Right to pollute
Farmers, more than most businesses in American society, are
largely immune from pollution-control regulations.  Particularly
in matters of soil erosion,  it has been the  long-accepted
presumption that farmers have the right to pollute adjacent
waterways and that the cost of any erosion-control measures on
the farm should be borne at last in part by the public.  Even
those measures are  largely voluntary on the part of the  farmer.
This right to pollute has been only sporadically challenged.  If,
however, society were to change the rules to  force farmers to
4internalize the costs of surface and groundwater pollution, then
farmers might be more disposed to favor agronomic practices that
result in less pollution.
3.  Price supports
American  farmers face a two-price system in wheat and  feed
grains.  If you participate in government programs, you get a
high price.  If you don't,  you get a low price.
Government price supports provide enormous incentives to
produce a handful of crops at output levels exceeding what they
would be without this form of government intervention  in output
markets.  This program works against a wide-scale adoption of
sustainable agriculture techniques to the extent that new systems
would require a change in crop selection or crop rotation.
Target prices for supported crops are so high that it  is
considered to be economic suicide for a farmer not to produce as
much of a supported crop as possible.  If a sustainable system
requires a shift in cropping patterns, the  farmer will  end up
growing less of the  lucrative program crops.  In addition, the
current rules governing the price support program work against
many rotation techniques by assigning acreage bases calibrated to
average plantings of the program crop over a period of years.
So the institution of crop price supports distort relative
output prices  in the same way that crop insurance and pollution
rights distort  relative factor input prices.
5Summary
Institutions and policies are not immutable.  As  they
change, so  do the relative factor and output prices  faced by the
farmer.  If insurance costs rise, for example, the farmer may
optimize by buying less insurance and more of some factor--which
might be crop diversification--to achieve the desired  level of
risk reduction.  Similarly, if soil erosion costs are
internalized, the private costs of certain practices and
associated inputs rise.  The farmer then looks  to different,
cheaper practices.  This is the sense  in which institutions
structure relative cost and income streams.  New institutions
create  (or are  induced by) new income flows.
The three institutions discussed here are not the only ones
that hinder wide-scale adoption of sustainable agriculture--state
and federal tax law provisions could easily be added to the list.
Nor are  institutions the only barriers.  Personal attitudes,
individual  farm physical or financial  characteristics, and lack
of clear cost advantages  in some instances also work against
adoption.  Simply demonstrating that an  acre of corn can be more
profitably grown under a sustainable system is an insufficient
demonstration of that system's  financial advantages.  Crop
budgets are  inadequate indicators of  financial  feasibility.
This argues for detailed long-term whole farm studies,
looking at the entire financial operation.  Some of these
studies have been attempted, but few are conclusive, and even
these were either largely done outside the U.S.,  where different
6institutions and, hence, different relative prices prevail,  or
they were done within the existing U.S.  institutional  framework.
What  is missing is  an analysis of relative profits under
different institutional as well as different agronomic systems.
In closing, if  sustainable agriculture is to be adopted
widely, its proponents must demonstrate its superiority on  a
whole-farm financial basis under the current institutional regime
or else identify greater profit opportunities under different
regimes.  Three major institutional innovations are required  if
sustainable agriculture is  to compete on a level  field:
- Take or buy the farmer's  right to pollute.
- Take or buy the farmer's  right to commodity-specific
government subsidies.
Change government risk management schemes  from those
that buffer prices to those that buffer income.
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